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  The	   Intergenerational	   Foundation	   (www.if.org.uk)	   is	   an	   independent,	   non-­‐party-­‐political	  charity	   that	   exists	   to	   protect	   the	   rights	   of	   younger	   and	   future	   generations	   in	   British	   policy-­‐making.	  Whilst	   increasing	   longevity	   is	   to	   be	   welcomed,	   our	   changing	   national	   demographic	   and	  expectations	   of	   entitlement	   are	   placing	   increasingly	   heavy	   burdens	   on	   younger	   and	   future	  generations.	   From	   housing,	   health	   and	   education	   to	   employment,	   taxation,	   pensions,	   voting,	  spending	  and	  environmental	  degradation,	   younger	   generations	   are	  under	   increasing	  pressure	  TheThe	  Risingto	  maintain	  the	  intergenerational	  compact	  whilst	  losing	  out	  disproportionately	  to	  older,	  wealthier	  cohorts.	  IF	  questions	  this	  status	  quo,	  calling	  instead	  for	  sustainable	  long-­‐term	  policies	  that	  are	  fair	  to	  all	  –	  the	  old,	  the	  young	  and	  those	  to	  come.	  	  For	  further	  information	  on	  IF’s	  work	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  contact	  Liz	  Emerson:	  	  	  Intergenerational	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  Half	  Moon	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  London	  SE24	  9JS	  www.if.org.uk	  info@if.org.uk	  07971	  228823	  @inter_gen	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Foreword	  	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  living	  longer	  is	  to	  be	  celebrated.	  One	  person	  currently	  turns	  65	  years	  of	  age	  every	  41	  seconds	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  number	  of	  elderly	  is	  set	  to	  increase	  rapidly	  over	  coming	  decades	  as	  the	  “baby	  boom”	  generation	  –	  those	  larger	  cohorts	  of	  babies	  born,	  in	  broad-­‐brush	  terms,	  between	  1946	  and	  1965	  –	  continue	  to	  feed	  through	  to	  old-­‐age.	  It	  means	  that	  our	  demographic	  pyramid	  is	  changing	  shape	  as	  the	  over-­‐65s	  now	  make	  up	  one	  in	  six	  people	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Large	  cohort	  sizes	  bring	  with	  them	  power	  in	  the	  form	  of	  voter	  representation	  and	  this	  report,	  an	  update	  of	  our	  2012	  report,	  compares	  the	  likely	  voting	  power	  of	  the	  “grey	  vote”	  with	  that	  of	  younger	  people,	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  democratic	  deficit	  has	  worsened	  and	  who	  will	  wield	  most	  voting	  power	  in	  the	  future.	  According	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  report,	  we	  should	  all	  be	  concerned.	  Ageing,	  cohort	  size,	  and	  the	  increasing	  propensity	  of	  older	  people	  to	  vote,	  and	  vote	  conservatively,	  is	  changing	  the	  demographic	  profile	  and	  increasing	  the	  democratic	  deficit.	  Older	  people	  are	  massively	  outvoting	  the	  young.	  In	  a	  representative	  democracy,	  those	  who	  vote	  tend	  to	  have	  their	  interests	  prioritised.	  As	  recent	  policy	  announcements	  have	  shown,	  those	  who	  have	  voted	  most,	  have	  had	  their	  interests	  protected	  while	  the	  young	  have	  seen	  the	  systematic	  removal	  of	  their	  welfare	  protections	  such	  as	  housing	  benefit,	  unemployment	  benefits,	  travel	  concessions,	  maintenance	  grants,	  while	  being	  asked	  to	  continue	  to	  fund	  £5	  billion	  worth	  of	  “universal”	  benefits	  for	  the	  old.	  This	  is	  at	  a	  time	  when	  our	  state	  pension	  deficit	  is	  already	  over	  £4	  trillion,	  the	  public	  sector	  pension	  deficit	  stands	  at	  £1.2	  trillion,	  our	  National	  Health	  Service	  is	  running	  on	  empty	  and	  our	  national	  debt	  as	  a	  proportion	  to	  GDP	  is	  the	  ninth	  highest	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  on	  a	  par	  with	  France	  and	  Spain.	  It	  should	  matter	  to	  us	  all	  if	  democratic	  participation	  tilts	  too	  far	  in	  favour	  of	  one	  group	  of	  people,	  and	  we	  hope	  that	  this	  report	  will	  act	  as	  a	  wake-­‐up	  call	  to	  policy-­‐makers.	  We	  must	  do	  more	  to	  encourage	  the	  young	  to	  become	  more	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  democratic	  process,	  and	  we	  could	  follow	  the	  Estonians	  and	  enable	  electronic	  voting.	  Until	  that	  happens,	  older	  adults	  must	  use	  their	  own	  franchise	  to	  vote	  in	  young	  people’s	  interests,	  after	  all	  our	  children	  and	  grandchildren	  who	  will	  be	  most	  affected	  the	  by	  today’s	  decisions	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.	  	  
Angus	  Hanton	  Co-­‐Founder	  Intergenerational	  Foundation	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Introduction	  In	   2012,	   the	   Intergenerational	   Foundation	   published	   “The	   Rise	   of	   Gerontocracy?”1	  The	   report	  detailed	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  there	  had	  arisen	  an	  “intergenerational	  democratic	  deficit”,	  in	  which	  young	  people	  were	  becoming	  disenfranchised	  relative	  to	  older	  people.	  It	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  British	  electorate	  was	  not	  only	  older	  than	  at	  any	  point	  since	  mass	  democratisation,	  but	  also	  set	  to	   age	   further,	   and	   rapidly,	   over	   coming	   decades.	   This	   was	   due	   to	   some	   extent	   to	   increased	  longevity,	  but	  also	  the	  advance	  through	  the	  life	  course	  of	  the	  “baby	  boomer”	  cohort.	  The	  deficit	  is	  exacerbated,	  significantly,	  by	  the	  greater	  propensity	  of	  older	  people	  to	  vote.	  This	   report	   updates	   the	  2012	  analysis	   following	   the	  2015	  general	   election,	  which	  delivered	   a	  Conservative	  majority	  government	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1992.	  In	  Part	  A	  it	  considers	  both	  the	  age	  balance	  among	  potential	  (section	  1),	  registered	  (section	  2)	  and	  actual	  (section	  3)	  voters	  in	  the	   electorate	   in	   2015,	   and	   how	   this	   balance	   will	   develop	   up	   to	   the	   2050	   election.	   It	   also	  considers,	   in	   Part	   B,	   the	   Conservative	   victory	   in	   more	   detail	   by	   assessing	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  constituencies	   it	   won	   in	   England	   across	   two	   crucial	   dimensions:	   firstly,	   the	   age	   structure	  (section	   4),	   and	   secondly,	   the	   proportion	   of	   residents	   with	   different	   types	   of	   housing	   tenure	  (section	  5).	  Housing	   tenure	  and	  age	  are	  often,	   in	  practice,	  proxies	   for	  one	  another;	   across	   the	  lifecourse	  and	  people	  tend	  to	  move	  from	  renting	  to	  mortgage-­‐holding,	  and	  on	  to	  outright	  home-­‐ownership.	  It	  is	  necessary,	  however,	  to	  consider	  the	  electoral	  implications	  of	  this	  relationship	  in	  more	  depth.	  It	   is	  of	  course	  not	  the	  case	  that	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  young	  people	  within	  the	  electorate	  –	  or	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  young	  people	  actually	  exercising	  their	  vote	  –	  would	  transform	  British	  politics.	  We	  know	  that	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  as	  they	  get	  older,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  think,	  or	  vote,	  in	  simple	  age	  blocs.	  There	  is,	  for	  instance,	  a	  remarkable	  degree	  of	  unity	  across	  age	  cohorts	   in	  Britain	  regarding	  what	  the	  priorities	  for	  public	  spending	  should	  be	  –	  with	  even	  people	  aged	  18–29	  agreeing	  that	  pensioner	  benefits	  should	  be	  prioritised	  within	  social	  security	  expenditure.2	  However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   we	   should	   not	   be	   concerned	   about	   the	   growing	  intergenerational	   democratic	   deficit,	   for	   two	  main	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   although	   young	   people	   do	  not	   speak	  with	  one	   voice,	   their	  many	  voices	   can	  be	  heard.	  The	   extent	   to	  which	   governments’	  apparent	  favouritism	  towards	  older	  people	  is	  responsible	  for	  such	  outcomes	  is	  contestable,	  but	  it	   is	   nevertheless	   the	   case	   that	   today’s	   young	   people	   are	   much	   worse	   off	   in	   employment,	  education	  and	  housing	  than	  both	  older	  generations,	  and	  previous	  generations	  of	  young	  people.	  	  Secondly,	   and	   more	   fundamentally,	   we	   have	   to	   consider	   the	   possibility,	   as	   explored	   in	   the	  original	   report,	   that	   the	   intergenerational	   democratic	   deficit	   undermines	   one	   of	   the	   key	  “unwritten	   rules”	   of	   representative	  democracy,	   that	   is,	   that	   those	  who	  will	   be	   affected	  by	   the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  for	  longest	  should	  have	  the	  greatest	  representation	  at	  the	  ballot	   box.	   There	   has	   never	   been	   an	   authentic	   democracy	   in	   any	   large	   society	   without	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Berry,	  Craig	  (2012)	  “The	  Rise	  of	  Gerontocracy?	  Addressing	  the	  Intergenerational	  Democratic	  Deficit”,	  The	  Intergenerational	  Foundation,	  available	  at:	  http://www.if.org.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/04/IF_Democratic_Deficit_final.pdf.	  2	  Berry,	  Craig	  and	  Berry,	  Richard	  (2014)	  “Do	  governments	  favour	  the	  old,	  and	  would	  it	  be	  different	  if	  younger	  people	  
voted?”,	  The	  Conversation,	  14	  May,	  available	  at	  https://theconversation.com/hard-­‐evidence-­‐do-­‐governments-­‐favour-­‐the-­‐old-­‐and-­‐would-­‐it-­‐be-­‐different-­‐if-­‐young-­‐people-­‐voted-­‐26597.	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pyramid-­‐shaped	  age	  distribution	  –	  yet	  we	  are	  moving	  rapidly,	  and	  unavoidably,	  towards	  a	  much	  more	  dome-­‐shaped	  age	  profile.	  	  The	   improvements	   in	   longevity	   that	   are	  bringing	  about	   this	  development	   are	   arguably	  one	  of	  the	   great	   successes	   of	   democracy,	   but	   nevertheless	   the	   implications	   for	   the	   future	   of	   the	  democratic	  process	  must	  not	  be	  ignored.	  The	   underlying	   research	   presented	   in	   this	   report	   draws	   upon	   two	  main	   sources.	   Firstly,	   the	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics’	  2014-­‐based	  population	  estimates	  and	  forecasts	  (sections	  1-­‐3),	  with	  population	  data	  adjusted	  according	  to	  evidence	  on	  voter	  registration	  provided	  by	  the	  Electoral	  Commission	   (section	   2),	   and	   on	   voter	   turnout	   provided	   by	   Ipsos-­‐MORI	   (section	   3).	   Secondly,	  2011	   census	   data	   on	   the	   age	   (section	   4)	   and	   housing	   tenure	   (section	   5)	   distribution	   within	  parliamentary	  constituencies.3	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics’	  2014-­‐based	  population	  estimates	  and	  forecasts	  are	  available	  at	  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-­‐reference-­‐tables.html?newquery=*&newoffset=0&pageSize=25&edition=tcm%3A77-­‐395151;	  the	  Electoral	  Commission’s	  voter	  registration	  analysis	  is	  available	  at	  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/145366/Great-­‐Britains-­‐electoral-­‐registers-­‐2011.pdf;	  Ipsos-­‐MORI’s	  voter	  turnout	  analysis	  is	  available	  at	  	  https://www.ipsos-­‐mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3575/How-­‐Britain-­‐voted-­‐in-­‐2015.aspx?view=wide;	  2011	  census	  data	  on	  age	  structure	  and	  housing	  tenure	  by	  parliamentary	  constituency	  are	  available	  at	  	  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-­‐census/key-­‐statistics-­‐and-­‐quick-­‐statistics-­‐for-­‐parishes-­‐and-­‐parliamentary-­‐constituencies-­‐in-­‐england-­‐and-­‐wales/index.html.	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PART	  A	  	  
1.	  The	  potential	  electorate	  This	  section	  considers	  the	  number	  of	  potential	  voters	  (that	  is,	  all	  members	  of	  the	  UK	  population)	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  life	  within	  the	  2015	  electorate	  (projected	  forward	  up	  to	  2050),	  in	  order	  to	  update	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  balance	  between	  different	  age	  cohorts	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  voting	  power.4	  The	   second	   and	   third	   sections	   take	   voter	   registration	   and	   turnout	   rates	   into	   account,	  and	   Part	   B	   of	   the	   report	   considers	   the	   party-­‐political	   implications	   of	   organising	   the	   potential	  electorate	   into	  relatively	  small,	  single-­‐member	  constituencies,	  which	  elect	  MPs	  on	  a	   first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post	  basis.	  At	  the	  2015	  general	  election,	  weight	  of	  numbers	  meant	  that	  potential	  voting	  power	  resided	  with	  people	  in	  their	  late-­‐40s	  and	  early-­‐50s,	  reflecting	  the	  baby	  boom	  of	  the	  1960s.	  The	  median	  voter	  was	   aged	   47	   (a	   year	   older	   than	   in	   2010,	   as	   reported	   in	   The	   Rise	   of	   Gerontocracy),	   and	   the	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  for	  people	  in	  their	  late-­‐40s	  was	  925,000,	  and	  for	  people	  in	  their	  early-­‐50s	  was	  912,000.	  In	  terms	  of	  potential	  voting	  power,	  people	  in	  their	  20s	  in	  2015	  were	  not	  that	   far	  behind,	  with	   an	  average	   single-­‐year	   cohort	   size	  of	  878,000.	  People	   in	   their	  30s	  were,	  however,	  further	  behind,	  with	  an	  average	  cohort	  size	  of	  846,000	  (and	  only	  815,000	  for	  late-­‐30s).	  Given	  that	  survival	  rates	  decline	  as	  cohorts	  age,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  people	  in	  later	  life	  have	  lower	   cohort	   sizes.	   Despite	   this,	   the	   impact	   of	   earlier	   baby	   booms	   and	   increasing	   longevity	  means	  that	  many	  older	  cohorts	  have	  significant	  potential	  electoral	  power.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2015	  there	  were	  more	  voters	  aged	  68	  than	  aged	  18,	  19,	  20,	  37,	  38,	  39	  or	  40.	  	  We	  can	  expect	  the	  rebalancing	  of	  potential	  voting	  power	  towards	  older	  people	  to	  persist.	  At	  the	  next	  general	  election,	  the	  median	  voter	  will	  be	  49	  years	  old,	  that	  is,	  two	  years	  older	  than	  in	  2010.	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  in	  their	  late-­‐20s	  and	  early-­‐30s	  will	  then	  be	  among	  the	  most	  populous	  cohorts,	  with	  average	  cohort	  sizes	  of	  919,000	  and	  912,000	  respectively.	  People	  in	  the	  early-­‐50s	  will	  have	  an	  average	  cohort	  size	  of	  918,000.	  Overall,	  there	  will	  be	  many	  more	  voters	  in	  their	  50s	  than	  in	  their	  20s	  or	  30s,	  with	  55	  year	  olds	  forming	  the	  most	  populous	  single-­‐year	  age	  cohort.	  By	  2030,	  the	  median	  voter	  will	  be	  50	  years	  old.	  There	  will	  be	  more	  potential	  voters	  in	  their	  60s	  (with	   an	   average	   single-­‐year	   cohort	   size	   of	   867,000)	   than	   in	   their	   20s	   (with	   an	   average	   of	  847,000),	  while	   potential	   voting	   power	  will	   generally	   be	   concentrated	   among	   people	   in	   their	  30s	  and	  40s.	  The	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  for	  people	  in	  their	  70s	  will	  by	  this	  point	  have	  reached	  637,000.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  analysis	  assumes	  that	  all	  individuals	  included	  in	  population	  estimates	  are	  eligible	  voters.	  In	  practice,	  some	  will	  not	  be	  eligible,	  but	  including	  these	  individuals	  makes	  only	  a	  negligible	  difference	  to	  the	  results.	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  By	  2040,	  the	  median	  voter	  will	  be	  51	  years	  old	  (The	  Rise	  of	  Gerontocracy	  had	  forecast	  that	  the	  median	  voter	  age	  would	  not	  reach	  51	  until	  2051).	  The	  age	  distribution	  by	  this	  point	  will	  have	  become	  quite	  flat,	  with	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  not	  falling	  below	  800,000	  until	  the	  age	  of	  75.	  This	  trend	  persists	  up	  to	  2050.	  There	  will	  actually	  be	  fewer	  potential	  voters	   in	  their	  70s,	  but	  many	  more	  in	  their	  60s	  and	  80s,	  and	  aged	  90	  or	  over.	  	  The	  table	  below	  demonstrates	  how	  cohort	  sizes	  for	  people	  in	  their	  70s	  and	  80s	  “catch	  up”	  with	  younger	   cohorts	   over	   the	  period	   studied.	  The	   average	   cohort	   size	   for	  70-­‐somethings	  will	   rise	  from	  56	  to	  77%	  of	   the	  average	   for	  20-­‐somethings,	  and	   from	  58	  to	  75%	  of	   the	  average	   for	  30-­‐somethings	   between	   2015	   and	   2050.	   The	   change	   for	   people	   in	   their	   80s	   will	   be	   even	   more	  significant.	  The	  average	  cohort	  size	  for	  80-­‐somethings	  will	  rise	  from	  29	  to	  63%	  of	  the	  average	  for	  20-­‐somethings,	  and	  from	  30	  to	  61%	  of	  the	  average	  for	  30-­‐somethings.	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2.	  The	  registered	  electorate	  The	  potential	  voting	  power	  of	  different	  age	  cohorts	  has	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  light	  of	  their	  actual	  ability	  to	  vote,	  that	  is,	  whether	  they	  are	  on	  the	  electoral	  register.	  We	  should	  recognise	  that	  some	  young	   people	   may	   have	   simply	   chosen	   not	   to	   be	   in	   the	   electoral	   register,	   and	   their	  disenfranchisement	   in	   this	   regard	   is	   their	   own	   fault.	   However,	   as	   discussed	   in	   The	   Rise	   of	  Gerontocracy,	   there	   are	   structural	   reasons	   which	   make	   registration	   more	   difficult	   for	   young	  people.	  	  We	  should	  also	  recognise	  that	  registration	  rates	  may	  have	  improved	  among	  young	  people	  since	  2011	  (the	  latest	  available	  age	  breakdown	  of	  the	  electoral	  register,	  which	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  analysis	   here),	   given	   increased	   publicity	   around	   this	   issue	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   2015	   election.	  However,	  we	  also	  know	  that	  the	  move	  to	  individual	  voter	  registration	  is	  likely	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  structural	  barriers	  to	  registration	  among	  young	  people;	  as	  such,	  while	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  differential	   registration	  rates	  on	   the	  2015	  election	  may	  over-­‐estimate	   the	   intergenerational	  democratic	   deficit,	   our	   analysis	   of	   future	   elections	   is	   highly	   likely	   to	   under-­‐estimate	   young	  people’s	  disenfranchisement	  in	  this	  regard.5	  At	   the	   2015	   general	   election,	   while	   the	   median	   potential	   voter	   was	   aged	   47,	   the	   median	  registered	   voter	   was	   aged	   50	   (based	   on	   registration	   rates	   observed	   in	   2011).	   Voting	   power	  resided	   largely	   among	   people	   aged	   in	   their	   40s	   (particularly	   late-­‐40s)	   and	   50s	   (particularly	  early-­‐50s),	  with	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  sizes	  of,	   respectively,	  767,000	  and	  748,000.	  Young	  people	  were	  even	  further	  disenfranchised	  on	  this	  measure,	  with	  an	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  for	  people	  in	  their	  20s	  of	  563,000.	  There	  were	  more	  registered	  voters	  aged	  68	  than	  at	  any	  other	  age	  up	  to	  42,	  and	  more	  aged	  72	  than	  any	  age	  up	  to	  24.6	  If	  registration	  rates	  remain	  as	  they	  were	  recorded	  in	  2011	  (which	  we	  consider	  unlikely,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  given	  the	  impact	  of	  individual	  voter	  registration	  on	  young	  people),	  the	  median	  registered	  voter	  will	  be	  51	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  next	  general	  election.	  Voting	  power	  will	  reside	  with	  people	   in	  their	  50s,	  who	  will	  have	  an	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  of	  799,000,	  compared	  to	  717,000	  for	  people	  in	  their	  40s,	  706,000	  for	  people	  in	  their	  30s,	  and	  561,000	  for	  people	  in	  their	  20s	  (which	  is	  only	  slightly	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  for	  people	  in	  their	  70s).	  By	  2030,	  the	  median	  registered	  voter	  will	  be	  53	  years	  old.	  Voting	  power	  will	  reside	  with	  people	  in	  their	  60s,	  who	  will	  have	  an	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  of	  797,000,	  compared	  to	  725,000	  for	   people	   in	   their	   50s,	   765,000	   for	   people	   in	   their	   40s,	   719,000	   for	   people	   in	   their	   30s,	   and	  541,000	   for	  people	   in	   their	  20s	  (which	   is	  now	   lower	   than	  the	  average	   for	  people	   in	   their	  70s,	  that	  is,	  599,000).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See	  pp	  33–35	  and	  pp	  49–50	  of	  The	  Rise	  of	  Gerontocracy	  for	  a	  longer	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues.	  6	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Electoral	  Commission’s	  registration	  rates	  refers	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  eligible	  voters	  that	  are	  registered.	  This	  creates	  a	  discrepancy	  when	  applied	  to	  our	  measure	  of	  potential	  voters,	  but	  one	  which	  makes	  only	  a	  negligible	  difference	  to	  the	  results.	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  By	  2040,	  the	  median	  registered	  voter	  will	  be	  54	  years	  old.	  Voting	  power	  will	  reside	  with	  people	  in	  their	  40s	  and	  50s,	  with	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  sizes	  of,	  respectively,	  775,000	  and	  772,000.	  The	   average	   for	   people	   in	   their	   20s	  will	   be	   only	   590,000,	   compared	   to	   731,000	   for	   people	   in	  their	  70s.	  By	  2050,	   the	  median	  registered	  voter	  will	  be	  55	  years	  old.	  Voting	  power	  will	  reside	  with	  people	  in	  their	  50s	  (particularly	  late-­‐50s)	  and	  60s,	  with	  an	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  of,	  respectively,	  785,000	  and	  779,000.	  There	  will	  be	  significantly	  more	  registered	  voters	  in	  their	  70s	  than	  in	  their	  20s.	  Moreover,	  the	  average	  single-­‐cohort	  size	  for	  people	  in	  their	  late-­‐80s	  will	  be	  only	  slightly	  lower	  than	  that	  for	  people	  aged	  18–24.	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  At	   the	  2015	   general	   election,	   the	  median	   actual	   voter	  was	   aged	  51,	   four	   years	   older	   than	   the	  median	  potential	  voter.	  Actual	  voting	  power	  resided	  largely	  among	  people	  aged	  in	  their	  late-­‐40s	  and	   early-­‐50s,	   with	   average	   single-­‐year	   cohort	   sizes	   of,	   respectively,	   666,000	   and	   657,000.	  Taking	   turnout	   into	   account	   demonstrates	   the	   relatively	   limited	   role	   of	   young	   people	   in	   the	  democratic	   process.	   The	   average	   single-­‐year	   cohort	   size	   for	   people	   in	   their	   20s	  was	  426,000,	  and	  497,000	  for	  people	  in	  their	  30s.	  This	  compares	  to	  an	  average	  of	  632,000	  for	  people	  in	  their	  50s,	  and	  551,000	  for	  people	  in	  their	  60s.7	  If	  turnout	  rates	  remain	  constant,	  by	  the	  next	  election,	   in	  2020,	  the	  median	  actual	  voter	  will	  be	  52.	  Actual	  voting	  power	  will	  reside	  with	  people	  in	  their	  50s,	  with	  an	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	   of	   677,000	   (692,000	   for	   people	   in	   their	   late-­‐50s).	   People	   in	   their	   early-­‐70s	  will	   have	   an	  average	   cohort	   size	   significantly	   higher	   than	   people	   in	   their	   20s,	   early-­‐30s	   and	   early-­‐40s.	   By	  2030,	  the	  median	  actual	  voter	  will	  be	  a	  further	  two	  years	  older,	  that	  is,	  54.	  Actual	  voters	  in	  their	  60s	  will	  have	  an	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  significantly	  higher	  than	  other	  age	  groups,	  that	  is,	   672,000,	   compared	   to	   410,000,	   537,000,	   604,000	   and	   612,000	   for	   people	   in	   their,	  respectively,	  20s,	  30s,	  40s	  and	  50s.	  There	  will	  be	  more	  actual	  voters	  aged	  72	  than	  any	  other	  age	  up	  to	  31,	  with	  an	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  for	  people	  in	  their	  early-­‐70s	  of	  546,000	  By	  2040,	  the	  median	  registered	  voter	  will	  be	  55	  years	  old.	  Actual	  voting	  power	  will	  reside	  with	  people	  in	  their	  50s,	  whose	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  of	  653,000	  will	  be	  significantly	  higher	  than	   other	   age	   groups.	   The	   average	   single-­‐year	   cohort	   size	   for	   people	   in	   their	   20s	   will	   be	  447,000	  and	  520,000	   for	  people	   in	   their	  30s	  –	  both	  of	  which	  are	  substantially	   lower	   than	   the	  average	   for	   people	   in	   their	   60s	   (611,000)	   and	   70s	   (607,000).By	   2050,	   the	  median	   registered	  voter	  will	  be	  56	  years	  old.	  Actual	  voting	  power	  will	  be	  concentrated	  among	  people	  in	  their	  50s	  and	   60s,	   with	   average	   single-­‐year	   cohort	   sizes	   of,	   respectively,	   665,000	   and	   655,000.	   Actual	  voters	   aged	   in	  both	   their	  70s	   (558,000)	   and	  early-­‐80s	   (517,000)	  will	   have	   an	   average	   single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  significantly	  above	  that	  of	  people	  in	  their	  20s	  (452,000).	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Actual	  voter	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  sizes	  for	  selected	  age	  groups	  2015–2050	  (’000)	  
 
 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 
      
20-29 426 425 410 447 452 
30-39 497 493 537 520 565 
      
70-79 381 453 497 607 559 
(% 20-29) (89) (107) (121) (136) (124) 
[% 30-39] [77] [92] [93] [117] [99] 
      
80-89 199 224 320 365 459 
(% 20-29) (47) (53) (78) (82) (102) 
[% 30-39] [40] [45] [60] [60] [81] 	  The	  table	  above	  demonstrates	  how	  cohort	  sizes	  for	  actual	  voters	  in	  their	  70s	  and	  80s	  catch	  up	  and	  indeed	  overtake	  younger	  cohorts	  over	  the	  period	  studied.	  The	  average	  actual	  voter	  cohort	  size	  for	  70-­‐somethings	  will	  rise	  from	  89	  to	  124%	  of	  the	  average	  for	  20-­‐somethings,	  and	  from	  77	  to	   99%	   of	   the	   average	   for	   30-­‐somethings	   between	   2015	   and	   2050.	   The	   change	   for	   people	   in	  their	  80s	  will	  be	  even	  more	  significant.	  The	  average	  cohort	  size	  for	  80-­‐somethings	  will	  rise	  from	  47	   to	   102%	   of	   the	   average	   for	   20-­‐somethings,	   and	   from	   40	   to	   81%	   of	   the	   average	   for	   30-­‐somethings.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  responses	  to	  evidence	  of	  the	  de	  facto	  disenfranchisement	  of	  young	  people	  is	  to	  argue	   for	   the	   enfranchisement	   of	   16	   and	   17	   year	   olds	   (although	   this	   policy	   is	   principally	  justified	  with	  reference	  to	  human	  rights).	  If	  16	  and	  17	  year	  olds	  had	  been	  included	  in	  the	  2015	  electorate,	   the	  median	  potential	   voter	  would	  have	  been	  a	  year	  younger	   in	  2015,	   and	  at	   every	  other	  year	  forecast	  in	  this	  report.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  they	  would	  have	  voted	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  18	  year	  olds,	  the	  median	  actual	  voter	  would	  have	  been	  the	  same	  age	  as	  in	  the	  electorate	  without	  16	  and	  17	  year	  olds,	  although	  the	  median	  actual	  voter	  would	  be	  a	  year	  younger	  by	  2040.	  There	   are	   two	   key	   implications	   of	   this	   limited	   impact	   on	   the	   intergenerational	   democratic	  deficit	   of	   enfranchising	   16	   and	   17	   year	   olds.	   Firstly,	   those	   in	   favour	   of	   votes	   at	   16	   should	  recognise	  that	  simply	  widening	  the	  range	  of	  young	  people	  able	  participate	  in	  elections	  will	  not	  significantly	   rebalance	   voting	   power	   away	   from	   older	   cohorts,	   especially	   if	   their	   electoral	  turnout	  is	  comparable	  to	  people	  in	  their	  late-­‐teens	  and	  early-­‐20s	  already	  enfranchised.	  A	  wider	  set	  of	  reforms	  to	  increase	  participation	  in	  the	  democratic	  process	  by	  young	  people	  is	  required.	  Secondly,	   the	  argument	  made	  by	  opponents	  of	  extending	   the	   franchise	  to	  16	  and	  17	  year	  olds	  that	   this	   reform	  would	   have	   a	   deleterious	   impact	   on	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   democratic	   process	   is	  now	   rendered	   impotent.	   If	   votes	   at	   16	   can	   be	   justified	   in	   principle	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   human	  rights	   (which	   we	   recognise	   is	   contested),	   there	   are	   few	   reasons	   to	   assume	   it	   would	   have	   a	  significant	  impact	  on	  democratic	  practice.	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PART	  B	  	  
4.	  The	  Conservative	  Party	  and	  older	  voters	  in	  2015	  We	  know	  that	  older	  people	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  than	  younger	  people.	  The	  2015	  general	  election	  confirmed	  this	  trend:	  27%	  of	  18–24	  year	  old	  voters	  voted	  for	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  (down	  from	  30%	  in	  2010),	  compared	  to	  47%	  of	  those	  aged	  65	  or	  over	  (up	  from	  44%	  in	  2010).8	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  ageing	  of	  the	  electorate	  was	  a	   contributing	   factor	   in	   the	  Conservative	  Party’s	   victory.	  However,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   consider	  how	  such	  dynamics	  interact	  with	  Britain’s	  single-­‐member,	  first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post	  electoral	  system	  –	  especially	  given	  that	  differences	  between	  other	  age	  groups	  are	  relatively	  slight	  (33%	  of	  25–34	  year	  olds	  voted	  for	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  compared	  to	  37%	  of	  55–64	  year-­‐olds).	  According	  to	  2011	  census	  data,	  an	  average	  of	  12%	  of	  residents	  in	  parliamentary	  constituencies	  in	  England	  are	  aged	  16–24,	  27%	  are	  aged	  25–44,	  26%	  are	  aged	  45–64,	  and	  17%	  are	  aged	  65	  or	  over.	  However,	  the	  age	  structure	  of	  the	  seats	  won	  by	  the	  two	  main	  parties	  in	  England	  in	  2015	  differs	  significantly.	   In	  the	  average	  constituency	  won	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  11%	  are	  aged	  16–24,	  26%	  are	  aged	  25–44,	  27%	  are	  aged	  45–64,	  and	  18%	  are	  aged	  65	  or	  over.	  In	  the	  average	  constituency	  won	  by	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  13	  per	  cent	  are	  aged	  16–24,	  30	  per	  cent	  are	  aged	  25–44,	  24	   per	   cent	   are	   aged	   45–64,	   and	   14	   per	   cent	   are	   aged	   65	   or	   over.	   While	   Conservative	  constituencies	   have	   slightly	   fewer	   young	   people,	   and	   slightly	   more	   older	   people,	   than	   the	  England	   average,	   Labour	   constituencies	   have	   significantly	   fewer	   older	   people,	   and	   a	   higher	  concentration	  of	  people	  aged	  24–44,	  than	  the	  average.	  In	  terms	  of	  seats	  gained	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  in	  2015,	  which	  they	  had	  not	  won	  in	  2010,	  on	  average	  12%	  are	  aged	  16–24,	  26%	  are	  aged	  25–44,	  27%	  are	  aged	  45–64,	  and	  18%	  are	  aged	  65	  or	  over.	   In	   terms	  of	  seats	  specifically	  gained	   from	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  on	  average	  12%	  are	  aged	  16–24,	  27%	  are	  aged	  25–44,	  26%	  are	  aged	  45–64,	  and	  15%	  are	  aged	  65	  or	  over.	   In	  short,	   the	  seats	   that	   the	   Conservative	   Party	   gained	   in	   2015,	   including	   from	   Labour,	   closely	   resemble	   a	  typical	  English	  constituency	  –	  which	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  won	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party.	  Further	  research	   would	   be	   required	   to	   determine	   whether	   demographic	   change	   within	   these	  constituencies	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  balance	  of	  political	  power	  swung	  to	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  in	  these	  areas.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Ipsos-­‐MORI	  (2015)	  How	  Britain	  Voted	  in	  2015,	  available	  at	  	  https://www.ipsos-­‐mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3575/How-­‐Britain-­‐voted-­‐in-­‐2015.aspx?view=wide.	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5.	  The	  Conservative	  Party	  and	  home-­‐owners	  in	  2015	  As	   noted	   in	   the	   introduction,	   age	   and	   housing	   tenure	   status	   are	   closely	   related.	   This	   section	  considers	  therefore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  households	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  constituencies	  won	  by	  the	   Conservative	   Party	   in	   England	   at	   the	   2015	   general	   election	   are	   disproportionately	   home-­‐owners	  (or	  mortgage-­‐holders).	  According	  to	  2011	  census	  data,	  an	  average	  of	  17%	  of	  residents	  in	  parliamentary	  constituencies	  in	  England	  are	  social	  renters,	  16%	  of	  households	  are	  private	  renters,	  33%	  are	  mortgage-­‐holders,	  and	  31%	  own	  their	  home	  outright.	  However,	   the	  housing	  tenure	  distribution	  of	   the	  seats	  won	  by	  the	  two	  main	  parties	  differs	  markedly.	  In	  the	  average	  constituency	  won	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	   14%	   are	   social	   renters,	   15%	   are	   private	   renters,	   35%	   are	  mortgage-­‐holders,	   and	   35%	  own	  their	  home	  outright.	  In	  the	  average	  constituency	  won	  by	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  24%	  are	  social	  renters,	  19%	  are	  private	  renters,	  30%	  are	  mortgage-­‐holders,	  and	  25%	  own	  their	  home	  outright.	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In	  terms	  of	  seats	  gained	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  in	  2015,	  which	  they	  had	  not	  won	  in	  2010,	  on	  average	   20%	   of	   households	   are	   social	   renters,	   15%	   are	   private	   renters,	   36%	   are	   mortgage-­‐holders,	  and	  28%	  own	  their	  home	  outright.	  In	  terms	  of	  seats	  specifically	  gained	  from	  the	  Labour	  	  Party,	  on	  average	  24%	  are	  social	  renters,	  19%	  are	  private	  renters,	  30%	  are	  mortgage-­‐holders,	  and	  25%	  own	  their	  home	  outright.	  	  As	   such,	   the	  housing	   tenure	  distribution	   in	  a	   typical	   seat	   that	  Labour	   lost	   to	   the	  Conservative	  Party	  is	  almost	  identical	  to	  that	  for	  a	  typical	  seat	  still	  held	  by	  Labour.	  However,	  in	  seats	  gained	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  in	  2015	  in	  general	  (most	  of	  which	  were	  from	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats),	  although	   the	   average	  proportion	  of	  households	  owning	   their	  home	  outright	   is	   lower	   than	   the	  English	  average,	   the	  proportion	  of	  mortgage-­‐holders	   is	  much	  higher	   than	  the	  English	  average,	  and	  higher	  even	  than	  the	  proportion	  in	  a	  typical	  Conservative	  constituency.	  These	   results	   suggest	   it	   may	   be	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   parliamentary	   constituencies	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  housing	  tenure	  distribution,	  rather	  than	  the	  age	  distribution,	  is	  a	  more	  significant	  explanation	   for	   the	   Conservative	   Party’s	   electoral	   victory.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   older	  groups	  are	  not	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  Conservatives,	  but	  rather	  that	  this	  dynamic	  cannot	  be	  understood	   without	   appreciating	   the	   role	   of	   home-­‐ownership	   in	   helping	   to	   shape	   seemingly	  age-­‐related	  political	  preferences.	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Conclusion	  	  The	  notion	  that	  different	  age	  groups	  are	  pitted	  against	  each	  other	  in	  a	  form	  of	  intergenerational	  warfare	  at	  the	  ballot	  box	  is	  far	  too	  simplistic.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  not	  be	  concerned	   about	   the	   relative	   absence	   of	   young	   people	  within	   democratic	   processes,	  whether	  this	  results	  from	  population	  ageing	  producing	  an	  older	  electorate,	  or	  wilful	  non-­‐participation	  by	  young	  people.	  People	  at	  different	   life-­‐stages	  obviously	  experience	  socio-­‐economic	  problems	   in	  different	  ways	  (even	  if	  members	  of	  the	  same	  age	  cohort	  invariably	  disagree	  on	  how	  to	  address	  these	  problems),	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  problematic	  if	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  one-­‐person-­‐one-­‐vote	  is	  that	  some	  age	  groups	  are	  heard	  more	  than	  others.	  	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   especially	   troubling	   that	   young	   people	   are	   the	   age	   group	   being	   relatively	  excluded	   from	   democratic	   life.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   many	   older	   people	   do	   not	   face	  hardship	  in	  myriad	  forms,	  but	  rather	  to	  note	  that	  when	  the	  people	  that	  will	  live	  for	  longest	  with	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  have	  a	  relatively	  limited	  role	  within	  it,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  democracy	  may	  be	  jeopardised.	  This	   is	  why	  the	  research	  reported	  in	  Part	  A	   is	  so	  alarming.	  The	  median	  voter	  age	  is	  set	  to	  rise	  rapidly,	   reaching	   49	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	   next	   general	   election	   in	   2020,	   and	   50	   by	   2040.	   If	   the	  greater	  propensity	  of	  older	  groups	  to	  vote	  is	  taken	  into	  account	  (that	  is,	  if	  current	  turnout	  rates	  are	  projected	  forwards)	  the	  median	  actual	  voter	  age	  is	  already	  above	  50,	  and	  will	  be	  55	  by	  2040.	  Population	  ageing	  is	  not	  a	  smooth	  process;	  it	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  lifecourse	  transition	  of	  baby	  boom	  generations,	   as	  well	   as	   by	   increased	   longevity,	   and	   there	  will	   be	   elections	   in	   coming	   decades	  when	  20-­‐somethings	  and	  30-­‐somethings	  are	  significantly	  more	  populous	  than	  they	  are	  now.	  In	  general,	   however,	  we	   are	   increasingly	   seeing	   that	   voting	   power	   is	   being	   concentrated	   among	  50-­‐somethings	   and	   60-­‐somethings	   –	   and	   it	   will	   not	   be	   long	   before	   70-­‐somethings	   and	   80-­‐somethings	  are	  exercising	  as	  much	  electoral	  power	  as	  young	  people	  (indeed,	  significantly	  more	  power	  if	  turnout	  is	  taken	  into	  account).	  Part	  B	  of	   the	  report	  considers	  how	  the	  age	  distribution	  of	   the	  current	  electorate	   in	  England	  is	  manifest	  in	  electoral	  results	  within	  Britain’s	  first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post	  electoral	  system.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Conservative	   seats,	   including	   the	   seats	  gained	   in	  2015,	   tend	   to	  have	  an	  older	  age	  profile	   than	  those	   won	   by	   Labour.	   This	   indicates	   that	   the	   ageing	   of	   the	   electorate	   is	   benefiting	   the	  Conservative	  Party	  more	  than	  its	  main	  electoral	  rival.	  However,	  the	  results	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  housing	  tenure	  status	  within	  English	  constituencies	  are	  even	  more	  significant.	  It	  is	  very	  clear	  that	  constituencies	  with	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  home-­‐owners	  and	  mortgage-­‐holders	  were	  more	  likely	   to	   be	  won	  by	   the	  Conservative	  Party	   in	   2015,	  with	   a	   particularly	   high	   concentration	   of	  mortgage-­‐holders	  in	  the	  seats	  gained	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  that	  they	  had	  not	  held	  in	  2010.	  	  This	  suggests,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  housing	  tenure	  may	  be	  a	  more	  cogent	  explanation	  than	  age	  in	   terms	   of	   accounting	   for	   the	   Conservative	   Party’s	   victory.	   Such	   a	   conclusion	  would	   fit	  with	  class-­‐based	   explanations	   of	   party	   affiliation	   –	   there	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   socio-­‐economic	   class	  remains	   the	   main	   determinant	   of	   how	   people	   vote,	   even	   if	   this	   dynamic	   has	   become	   more	  complex	   in	   recent	  decades.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   research	  reported	  here	  adds	  weight	   to	   the	  view	   that	   the	   influences	   of	   home-­‐ownership	   and	   age	   on	   political	   preferences	   are	   intimately	  related.	   Today’s	   younger	   people	   are	   not	   less	   likely	   to	   vote	   for	   the	   Conservative	   Party	   simply	  because	  they	  are	  young,	  but	  rather	  because	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  home-­‐owners.	  	  
	  The	  Intergenerational	  Foundation	  charity	  no:	  1142230	  www.if.org.uk	   17	  
	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   the	   Conservative	   Party	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   successful	   in	  positioning	   itself	   as	   the	  party	  of	  home-­‐owners,	  or	  of	   those	  accumulating	  housing	  wealth	  via	  a	  mortgage.	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  their	  electoral	  hegemony	  will	  become	  even	  further	  entrenched	  as	  the	  electorate	  ages,	  because	  we	  do	  not	  know	  if	  the	  relationship	  between	  housing	  wealth	  and	  age	  will	  persist.	  What	  we	  do	  know,	  however,	  is	  that	  younger	  cohorts,	  who	  have	  the	  strongest	  interest	  in	  advocating	  genuine	  housing	  market	  reform,	  thereby	  potentially	  altering	  the	  housing	  wealth/age	  dynamic,	  do	  not	  exist	   in	  sufficient	  numbers	  within	   the	  electorate	   (and	  do	  not	  seem	  prepared	  to	  exercise	  the	  potential	  voting	  power	  that	  they	  do	  possess)	  to	  bring	  about	  such	  reform	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.	  
